THE IMPACT OF HEALTH REFORM ON THE
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I.

INTRODUCrION

It is certain that the medical services industry's economic organization will change in the near future. It also seems highly
likely that changes in public policy, at both the federal and state
levels, will induce some of that change. As of this writing, the Clinton Administration's ideas on health reform have been written into
the American Health Security Act.' Aside from the promise of universal insurance coverage at some future date, however, the supplemental political message is that virtually any other part of the
proposal is subject to modification. This means that health reform
is somewhat of a moving target. Still, it is likely that broad features
of the current plan will survive, and so it will be those features that
this paper will examine.
There is, however, another type of health reform that is already underway. These reforms, generally denoted as "managed
competition," emphasize the virtues of vertical integration of insurance, care provision, and care management into single, competitive entities that are at the heart of the Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) relationship.2 The spread of such relationships, of one kind or another, has accelerated in recent years, with
t This Article was delivered at the Symposium on The U.S. Pharmaceutical
Industry in the 1990s: Facing Health Care Reform, Regulation, andJudicial Controls,
on November 16, 1993, at the Seton Hall University School of Law.
* A.B., Xavier University; M.A., University of Delaware; Ph.D., University of Virginia. Professor Pauly is the Bendheim Professor, Chairman and Professor of the
Health Care Systems Department, and Professor of Insurance and Public Policy and
Management, at the Wharton School, and Professor of Economics, in the School of
Arts and Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania. He served as Executive Director
of the Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics (LDI) from 1984-89 and currently
is LDI's Director of Research.
1 H.R. 3600/S. 1757, Health Care Security, Calendar No. 335, 103rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993).
2 Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Planfor the 1990s:
UniversalHealth Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy (pts. 1 &
2), 320 NEw ENG.J. MED. 29 (1989), 320 NEw ENG.J. MED. 94 (1989). A health maintenance organization (HMO) is an organization that agrees to deliver a defined set of
covered health services, based on patient need, in return for a capitated payment. It
usually (though not always) emphasizes preventive care, use of a selected panel of
health care providers, and management of the process of care by "gatekeeper" physicians. In contrast, conventional (or "indemnity") health insurance agrees to pay only
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insurance plans with some type of managed care feature now insuring a majority of the population aged below sixty-five years, and the
HMO form itself covering more than a quarter of this same population.' It is believed that these types of insurance plans greatly
change the behavior of the medical care system, even in the absence of public intervention or regulation. 4
In this paper I will explore the effects that health system reform, as embodied in the American Health Security Act, will have
on pharmaceutical markets. I will be concerned primarily with the
aggregate impact of the changes in coverage and regulatory policy,
rather then with specific regulations or procedures.
II.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CLINTON REFORM PLAN

The essence of the Clinton approach is the use of mandated
insurance coverage that will be delivered within a version of the socalled "managed competition" model. This model was originally
developed in large part by Professor Alain Enthoven of Stanford
University and a group of private sector policy analysts and managers known as the 'Jackson Hole Group."5 The version of managed
competition that emerges in the Administration's plan, however,
has some important differences from the model described by Enthoven and the Jackson Hole Group, to such an extent that Professor Enthoven has disavowed the Administration's version of his

own creation.6
According to the Clinton Plan, individuals and small employers would be required to obtain insurance coverage through a regionally based entity, known as a "Health Alliance."7 These Health
Alliances would be regulated by the government of the state in
which they are located, under rules promulgated by a national
health board, and would be staffed by appointees from the region.
for services the patient has obtained, and usually covers all health providers, with

relatively little management and emphasis on preventative care.
3 THE INTERSTUDY COMPETITIVE EDGE 1, No. I (Excelsior, Minn.:
1991).

InterStudy,

4 ALAIN ENTHOVEN, THEORY AND PRAcTICE OF MANAGED COMPETITION IN HEALTH

CARE FINANCE (1988).

5 Paul M. Ellwood et al., The Jackson Hole Initiativesfor a Twenty-First Century American Health Care System, 1 HEALTH ECON. 149 (1992).

6 Alain Enthoven & J. J. Singer, A Single-Payer System in Jackson Hole Clothing, 13
HEALTH AY. 81 (Supp. 1994).
7 A Health Alliance is an organization formed to pool premiums and disseminate
information on certified health care plans in the area to members of the alliance.
These organizations would neither deliver health care services nor pay providers di-

rectly. See Paul Starr & Walter A. Zelman, A Bridge to Compromise: Competition Under a
Budget, 12 HEALTH Art. 7, 10 (Supp. 1993).
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Large employers-those with over 5000 employees in the Administration's proposal-may either join the local health alliance or create their own "Corporate Alliance." A Health Alliance would
bargain with and, to some extent not yet completely specified, regulate a set of private-entity insurance plans, either for-profit or notfor-profit, called "accountable health plans."
Under the new plan, all U.S. citizens, including those living
abroad and legal residents, must obtain a federally mandated standard health benefit package by 1998. Eligible individuals would
not be able to interrupt health coverage even if they changed employment or location. Moreover, Accountable Health Plans
(AHPs) will not be permitted to deny coverage because of health,
age, occupation, or financial status. Individuals who fail to obtain
the health plan when they are required would nonetheless be enrolled in a plan when they seek or obtain medical care. Regional
or Corporate Health Alliances8 will be the conduit for providing
consumers with information about the different health plans, including such measures of quality or satisfaction as: the names of
participating doctors and hospitals, the number of people who enrolled and disenrolled, the premium, vaccination rates, survival
rates after heart surgery, and caesarean section births.
Those families having an employed family member would be
required to obtain coverage in connection with that employment.
Those families with only self-employed or non-employed individuals would be subject to an individual mandate. For those persons
who are employees, a portion of their compensation would have to
be paid in the form of a fraction of the health insurance policy
premium for the required coverage. The employer is required to
pay an amount equal to eighty percent of the average of the premium for the plans in the region. The portion of the premium
that the employee would pay directly will vary depending on the
plan chosen. That is, the employee will pay, with an explicit aftertax payment, any additional premium charged by a higher cost
plan. While most families would be required to pay the premium
in full with no subsidy, some governmental subsidies would be
available for very low income families or for families that contain
low wage workers, regardless of income. The twenty percent share
paid by the family will be subsidized for families with incomes below 150% of the poverty line. The eighty percent average premium paid directly by the employer would be subsidized if the
8 A regional or corporate alliance is similar in definition to a health alliance, but
the constituency would be defined by either employment or region or residence.
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employee's aggregate premium exceeded a given percentage of
the firm's payroll. For business with more than seventy-five employees, the maximum percentage of payroll that would have to be
paid is 7.9%. The maximum percentage is set at a lower rate for
very small and low wage firms, and this percentage increases to
7.9% as firm size and the average wage in the firm increases.
The new plan would cover people currently enrolled in the
federal Medicaid program who do not receive welfare payments.
People over sixty-five who are covered by the federal Medicare program generally would not participate in the new structure, but
would become eligible for additional coverage for prescription
drugs and some modest benefits for long-term care.
The proposed law sets forth a standard benefit package that is
very comprehensive. The standard package can be delivered in
three ways. First, the package can be delivered through a conventional insurance plan with twenty percent cost sharing and deductibles that range from $200 to $400. Second, the package can be
delivered in a plan similar to an HMO, with nominal cost sharing,
but with a limited choice of hospitals and doctors. Finally, there is
a combination plan with the same nominal cost sharing for selected providers as the low cost sharing plan, but with higher outof-pocket payment than the low cost sharing option.
The plan also contains a set of price controls, the most fundamental of which is a limit on the rate of growth in insurance premiums, tied to the overall rate of inflation, population growth, and a
very small additional amount. Second, no plan in a region can
charge a premium more than twenty percent of the average.
Third, doctors who are paid by an indemnity insurance plan must
accept a schedule of fees as payment in full; the doctors cannot bill
for any extra fees. Fourth, some special controls are put on the
prices Medicare will pay under the new prescription drug benefit.
Revenues to pay for the subsidies and additional Medicare
benefits come from four sources. First, new taxes will be imposed
on cigarettes and on insurance in Corporate Alliances. Second, as
the spending limit takes effect, a larger share of total compensation will become taxable as the employer-paid share declines.
Third, there will be some savings from abolishing federal programs
that duplicate the new coverage. Finally, cuts will be made in the
prospective budgets for the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
With regard to prescription drugs and biologicals for the population aged below sixty-five, the bill explicitly states that there will
be no price controls on retail or wholesale prices for drugs covered
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by AHP insurance.' Coverage is limited, however, to indications
approved by the Food and Drug Administration, or by other authoritative sources, as interpreted by the National Health Board
(NHB).1 0 The NHB can discuss or comment on, but it cannot regulate, the launch prices of new drugs.
For persons covered by the Medicare program, a new prescription drug benefit is provided, with a $250 deductible, twenty percent cost sharing, and a $1000 annual upper limit. Medicare
carriers are to judge the evidence on medically accepted indications. Further, the Secretary has authority to establish maximum
quantities per prescription or to limit refills, leading some commentators to believe that this provision amounts to a national
formulary.
Manufacturers must provide Medicare rebates of at least seventeen percent of the average retail price, and the Secretary has
the authority to negotiate reimbursement for new drugs judged to
be inappropriately priced. A key indicator of inappropriate pricing
is the selling of a new drug in other countries at a price lower than
that charged in the United States. Rebates to Medicare are not
required for generic drugs, but payment is limited to the median
of all generic prices.
III.

THE CLINTON PLAN AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY:

WHAT THE PLAN WOULD Do
The Clinton Plan will produce two major impacts on the price
(and quantity) of pharmaceuticals. First, the Plan will substantially
increase insurance coverage for drugs. At any given set of retail or
final prices, increased coverage lowers the user price, which is
known to cause an increase in the quantity of drugs demanded. 1
Such increases in insurance will occur both for Medicare and, via
the mandated minimum basic benefit package, for almost all other
citizens.
The Plan's other effect is regulatory: there will be regulatory
limits on pricing and/or total spending for both Medicare and
non-Medicare insureds. Some of these limits are indirect: there
9 President Clinton, Health Care Reform Proposal and Health Security Act, Address Before Congress (Oct. 27, 1993), in Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) No.
773, at A-17 (Nov. 1, 1993).
10 The National Health Board is a body of the federal government charged to
legislate the content of a comprehensive set of benefits to be provided. Starr &
Zelman, supra note 7.

11 Mickey C. Smith & Dewey D. Garner, Effects of a Medicaid Program on Prescription
Drug Availability and Acquisition, 12 MED. CARE 571 (1974).
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will be no specific unit price controls or price limits for the nonMedicare population, but there will be enforced limits on the level
and rate of growth of the premiums insurers charge to cover (in
part) the drug expenditures, and these limits must at some point
constrain expenditures. There are more direct limits in the Medicare program: mandatory discounts, ability to challenge pricing of
new drugs, and the potential for a national formulary.
Assuming that the gross price charged for medical goods or
services, among other things, remains equal, increased insurance
coverage lowers user price, increases the volume of services demanded, and therefore increases total expenditures. 12 Reductions
in gross prices have an ambiguous effect on total spending. While
lower prices and larger quantities are consistent with lower total
expenditures, an increase in quantity does have an effect on spending opposite to that of lower prices. Because Medicare coverage
contains a twenty percent coinsurance, the out-of-pocket payment
insureds face will fall if the gross price charged falls. If the quantity
demanded increases enough in response to the fall in price, the
result could be lower unit prices but higher total spending.
For particular drugs, the overall impact of these conflicting
policies will vary, depending primarily on the responsiveness of
quantity demanded to user price, and the extent of the current
profit margin. Roughly speaking, the combination of expanded insurance coverage and price limits will increase drug profits for
those products with high markups and high price responsivenessfor instance, leading brand drugs used to treat asymptomatic
chronic conditions. In contrast, those products with little price responsiveness ("essential" drugs for acute illnesses), and those with
low profit margins (generics or branded drugs with strong competition) will probably yield lower profits after reform. Therefore,
even if unit prices are restrained, the expansion of quantity demanded following increases in insurance coverage could increase
profits for those drugs whose use is highly responsive to insurance
coverage and which remain profitable even at constrained prices.
There are, however, consequences to price restraints. In the
short-term, there is a potential trade-off between the volume of
products of various types available and limits on their price. The
lower the unit price is set, the less likely that the product will be
furnished. Over the longer-term, there is an even more important
12 Willard G. Manning et al., A Controlled Trial of the Effect of PrepaidGroup Practiceon
the Use of Services, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1505 (1984).
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trade-off-between cheaper drugs now and better (if possibly more
costly) drugs later.
The logic of adjustment is straightforward enough: a profitseeking pharmaceutical firm's incentive to develop and test a new
product depends on the profits the firm expects to earn. Cutting
price, with other things being equal, cuts expected profits and
therefore will result in fewer new drugs being developed, but it
does mean that more people are willing to buy currently available
drugs, and will pay less if they do so. This trade-off is virtually unavoidable, but complex. Which does more harm: higher prices that
constrain some patient use of currently available drugs or fewer
beneficial new drugs for all patients? Because we don't know the answer to this question, there is no unique way to define the proper, fair, or
reasonableprice for drugs. The answer to the question of what is the
appropriate price is the answer to the alternative question of what
is the appropriate amount and type of new products to be introduced. Because no one knows the answer to the latter question, no
one can legitimately answer the former. This is not to say that we
know current drug prices are not too high; it is only to say that
current information is unable to provide an answer to this question. I will return to this question when I discuss specific drug
price controls.
IV.

ASPECTS OF THE CLINTON PLAN THAT WILL AFFECT DRUGS

The precise form that health reform will eventually take is unknown, and the Clinton Plan itself has changed and continues to
change frequently in its specifications. Therefore, the first and
most useful step is to analyze a set of "ideal-type" interventions, and
then to predict the effect of the actual plan as a function of how it
combines these types.
There are three types of potential plans:
1. Unit price controls, formularies, and additional coverage;
2. Altered incentives and managed competition, and additional coverage; and
3. Global spending limits, formularies, and additional
coverage.
I will now use each of these "ideal types" to describe the effects of
possible health reform.
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IMPACTS OF UNIT PRICE AND PRODUCT CONTROLS
IN A REFORMED HEALTH SYSTEM WITH
ADDITIONAL DRUG COVERAGE

If controls are placed on drug unit prices or on the types of
individual products that can be legally offered for sale, evaluation
of the controls' impact turns on the question of the effect of such
controls on supply. If, for example, the current price of a drug is
substantially in excess of its cost, however measured, and the quantity of the drug demanded is unresponsive to its price, reducing
that price will have the effect only of reducing the pure profit or
rent earned by those who own the firm that supplies the drug. In
the strictest economic sense, this change is neither efficient nor
inefficient, neither undesirable nor desirable. The change results
in only a redistribution of income to those who purchase drugs
from those who own drug company stock. Policy judgments about
the appropriateness of such redistribution can be based only on
ethical judgments, not economic judgments. The only external
standard that has some economic content is the standard of a normal or fair return on capital, but, as will be described in more detail below, even that standard is probably difficult, if not
impossible, to apply in the case of innovative drug products.
This conclusion will be altered if the price change affects the
quantity of the product demanded or supplied. Consider the effect of the proposed Medicare price rebate. There are offsetting
effects on demand and supply. The lower price should prompt patients to be willing to buy more of the drug. But the lower price
may also reduce the willingness of the manufacturer to make the
drug available for sale. If the demand side predominates, the key
question is the responsiveness of the quantity demanded to the
price cut. A seventeen percent discount that causes a seventeen
percent increase in quantity demanded will leave total revenues
and total drug spending unchanged-although drug firm profits
will fall because the additional product presumably costs something to produce. In general, evidence indicates that the demand
for drugs is sufficiently price inelastic so that total revenues will fall,
with some exceptions, when prices are cut.1 3
The supply side story is somewhat more complex because
drugs are produced under conditions that involve substantial fixed
costs. Those costs are incurred for initial research and development, obtaining regulatory approval, and starting up production.
13

Smith & Garner, supra note 11.
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The additional or marginal cost for one more unit of a drug can be
quite small, though short-term capacity limits associated with batch
production sometimes increase this cost. The result is that a product may not be covering all of its costs at some price, and yet the
seller may be willing to supply larger quantities at that price. Thus,
it is difficult to predict the effect of unit price reductions on firms'
short-run willingness to supply; such reductions may not decrease
such willingness at all.
The reason for this paradoxical conclusion is that, because of
patent protection or buyer ignorance, the drug firm may well be
charging a price that contains elements of monopoly rent-so that
price exceeds marginal cost. The constraint on quantity then
arises from demand-at that price buyers are unwilling to buy or
physicians unwilling to prescribe more of the drug-not from the
unwillingness of the firm to produce and supply more at that price.
If price controls push down the price, there may still be "excess
supply," at least in the short run. Indeed, the initial price, as
noted, might even be below average cost, but above marginal cost.
What prospective price controls will do, however, is reduce the willingness of firms to develop new products. Indeed, unusually high
profit rates, which appear to have persisted in the drug industry for
years, are both the cause and the effect of a rapid pace of introduction of new products-because higher-than-normal profits are the
market's signal to supply more of the profitable activity.
In addition to mandatory rebates, another important aspect of
the proposed Medicare drug benefit is a provision on the pricing
of newly introduced drugs. Higher prices in the United States than
in other countries, or just bureaucratic suspicion, can give the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) the power to require
companies to justify, presumably with cost information, the price of
new breakthrough drug products. Obviously, a key issue here is
the basis on which launch prices might be approved or
disapproved.
There are three alternative standards, and there is likely to be
considerable conflict and uncertainty until policy settles on one of
them and determines how they will be implemented. One standard would be based on some measure of the value of the new
product. Value might be measured either in terms of the product's ability to reduce cost elsewhere in the system (e.g., as in the
case of the new drug for schizophrenia), or it might be measured
in terms of effectiveness (e.g., quality of life). The other standard
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would relate the price of the drug to its cost, and try to determine a
price that would yield "reasonable" profits.
A third standard, which relates the price charged in the
United States to the price charged in the rest of the world, might
also be employed. This standard would, however, have two
problems of its own. First, such a standard could not be based on
the argument that higher prices in the United States than abroad
prove that Americans pay more for drugs than foreigners. As
Danzon and Kim' 4 have recently shown, there are many drug products sold in other countries that are not sold in the United States,
and some products sold in the United States that are not sold in
other countries. It often happens that the products sold exclusively in other countries carry higher prices, after adjustment for
therapeutic strength, than their United States counterparts. The
other problem is that such pricing structures may be unstable because of the presence of fixed costs. Firms may respond to regulations pointed at pricing differentials by raising their foreign prices
to eliminate the differential, rather than by cutting their United
States prices, or they may forego foreign markets altogether.
The value measure holds the greatest promise for usefulness
because it is, in principle, possible to quantify the cost offset or the
number of quality adjusted life years a given product might produce. This measure will, however, raise the difficult political question-especially when a product raises total costs but produces
better outcomes-of valuing what health outcomes are indeed
worth. Just because some products are sold at prices that imply
quite a low cost per quality adjusted life year (QALY) 5 added does
not mean that a new product, even if sold at a much higher price
per QALY, might still not be providing more benefit than cost.
The reason is that the new product may provide somewhat more
total QALYs per user, even if the additional benefits come at a rela-

14 p. Danzon &J. Kim, InternationalPrice Comparisonfor Pharmaceuticals(on file with
the Health Care Department, The Wharton School, Univ. of Penn.).

15 A QALY is a year equivalent of good health and is typically used as a homogenous output health care for the equivalent of cost effectiveness of treatment. George

W. Torrance, Measurement of Health State Utilitiesfor Economic Appraisal, 5 J. HEALTH
ECON. 1, 1-3 (1986). As LaPuma and Lawlor have explained, a QALY is "a numerical

description of the value that a medical procedure or service can provide to groups of
patients with similar medical conditions." John LaPuma & Edward F. Lawlor, QualityAdjusted Life-Years: Ethical Implicationsfor Physicians and Policymakers, 263 JAMA 2917,

2917 (1990). QALYs "attempt to combine expected survival with expected quality of
life in a single metric: if an additional year of healthy life is worth a value of 1 (year),
then a year of less healthy life is worth less than 1 (year)." Id. (footnote omitted).
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tively high cost. But if the value of those benefits is greater than
their cost, it is still better to permit the product to be sold.
The key issue in such a case relates to the other possible standard that might be employed: is the product for which a higher
price is proposed one with high enough costs to justify that price?
This would seem to be a simple enough question, at least in theory:
one would determine the costs that had been incurred to produce
the product and the amount of risk capital involved, and then calculate a price that would yield a reasonable return on that capital.
There are two difficulties with such a rate of return approach.
One difficulty, already well documented in public utility pricing, is
that guaranteeing a rate of return on equity capital leads to the use
of too much capital, relative to other inputs. This so-called
"Averch-Johnson" 16 effect is likely to prove even more difficult to
manage in the case of drug price regulation because the optimal or
needed amount of equity capital for new products is, almost by definition, very difficult to specify in advance. Additionally, one might
add the usual political economy difficulties that arise when a government agency must set a price that will affect profits. Lobbying,
payoffs, and favors almost inevitably develop precisely because the
standard is not easily measured or observed.
The other difficulty, already mentioned briefly, is special to
drugs. One of the key features of the American pharmaceutical
industry has been its amazing pace of discovering new products,
fueled by substantial private expenditures on research, development, and testing of new products. Profit-seeking firms are willing
to invest in such activities because the grant of a temporary legal
monopoly through the patent system will protect their commercially successful discoveries.
One of the important influences on expected profits from a
new product a firm is considering developing is the price the firm
can charge for that product. If the rules for approval of breakthrough drug prices mean that the firm cannot charge a profitmaximizing monopoly price, fewer new drugs will meet the expected profit screen for development. Hence, the level of price
regulation, whatever its impact on average returns to equity, will
primarily affect the number and type of new drugs that are developed. A higher profit for drug firms than could be earned in other
industries-something that appears to be characteristic over a long
16 Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REv. 1052 (1962).
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period of time 17 _is a signal for firms to develop a larger number
of new products, products with high expected development costs
relative to their expected net revenues. This means that a policy
decision to lower prices and profits to a "reasonable" level is, in
effect, a decision to have fewer new products, but cheaper old
products. The problem is that, to my knowledge, there is no reliable technique to judge what the optimal rate of flow of new products should be. Given the current state of ignorance on this
subject, it is equally wrong to assert that anything that slows the
development of beneficial new products is harmful (a typical industry position), or that limits on prices or profits will have no effect
on the flow of new products (a typical political critic position).
Without knowledge of the expected social benefit from potential
new products, knowledge that no one currently has, one cannot
determine the ideal price or profit rate.
Even if this problem of optimal incentives for technology was
not enough, economists generally have abandoned the attempt to
define a fair or reasonable price."8 The closest economists can
come to defining such a price is the rate of return that yields the
average or "normal" return on capital, a standard that public utility
regulators find very difficult to follow.
Entry into the new product business by profit-seeking firms
ought, in the long run, to reduce profit rates to the average level.
So perhaps the continued existence of above-normal profits signals
some kind of market imperfection or barrier to entry that could be
offset by price controls, with no harm to the rate of innovation.
One possible explanation for the persistence of profits in this industry is that different discoveries have different levels of expected
profits, almost from the moment of innovation. Equilibrium is
reached when the marginalnew drug, the one expected to have the
lowest expected profits, yields a competitive rate of return. But this
is perfectly consistent with yields on inframarginal discoverieslucky, good ideas-that are above the average. The rents to such
products have much the same characteristics as the rents earned by
those lucky enough to inherit more fertile or better located land.
To be sure, there is still a question of explaining who will collect
these returns, the scientist who discovers them, the CEO with an
17 Office of Technology Assessment, PharmaceuticalR&D: Costs, Risks, and Rewards,
OTA-H-522 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Feb. 1993).
18 See, e.g., Alan T. Peacock & Charles K. Rowley, Welfare Economics and the Public
Regulation of NaturalMonopoly, 1J. PUB. ECON. 227 (1972); Fred M. Westfield, Regulation and Conspiracy, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 424-43 (1965); Stanislaw H. Wellisz, Regulation
of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies: An Economic Analysis, 55 J. POL. ECON. 30 (1963).
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intuition for good research areas, or the scientific director with a
knack for spotting raw talent and a skill for negotiating compensation packages more favorable to the company.
A final difficulty with potential pharmaceutical price setting is
that of identifying the costs of making a new drug available. It is
difficult enough to allocate research expenses to one product relative to another, especially when the researchers often initially have
no clear idea about what the product is for which they are looking.
But it is also necessary for investors to cover the cost of unsuccessful development efforts (and unsuccessful drug companies).
There is considerable controversy over the average cost of developing a new drug, with estimates ranging from $140 million to $500
million. 9 From what has already been said, however, it should be
obvious that the average cost is irrelevant; it is the marginal costthat is, the cost of the drugs whose prospective profits are just high
enough to cover the prospective cost of investment in their development-that matters, and no one knows what that cost is.
Whatever cutoff return drug companies might use (explicitly or implicitly) for allocating research and development efforts, cost is of a
level just sufficient to yield that return on capital.
This observation relinks the rate-of-return method of price setting with the value method. It is possible to think of the price and
quantity that would yield an (expected) return equal to the market
return on a class of possible new drugs. It is possible to forecast,
with market research, that buyers might be willing to pay that price
for that quantity. But is this evidence that the drug is worth the
price? The presence of insurer and buyer ignorance may permit a
price to be charged that is in excess of total value. So it appears
that the issue of valuation arises even when a rate of return approach is used, and the problem is that valid techniques for measuring value are not yet available.
If there are to be price limits on drugs, what form might they
take, and what are the consequences of alternative forms? As already discussed, explicit price limits will be set for new breakthrough drugs. For existing branded drugs, the new law would
require all sellers to give a seventeen percent discount from the
average retail price. The intent is to obtain for Medicare the same
kind of discounted prices that managed care purchasers often obtain, and the proposed law copies a policy already in existence that
requires drug firms to give discounts to Medicaid programs if they
19 George Anders, Vital Statistic: Disputed Cost of Creating a Drug,WALL ST. J., Nov. 9,
1993, at B1.
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give discounts to any other buyers. The main problem with a required discounting approach is that it may cause the manufacturer
to increase the list price. There are two reasons why this might be
so. Most obviously, even if raising the list price causes some nonMedicare buyers to reduce purchases, those losses could be offset
by higher prices from Medicare sales. Moreover, because of the
increase in insurance coverage, non-Medicare buyers may be less
resistant to a price increase.
For generic drugs, Medicare will use a reference price system,
but it will not be very restrictive. Payment for the drug itself is limited to the ninety-third percentile of wholesale prices. For such
drugs, however, just as for branded drugs, the rate of increase in
price is to be tied to the overall inflation rate.
Section 2002 of the bill might have a major effect on the drug
industry, depending on how the legislation is interpreted by regulation. Section 2002 of the proposed law gives the secretary of
HHS the responsibility to "establish for each covered outpatient
drug standards for prescribing
the drug which are based on accepted medical practice. " 2 0 Such standards could amount to a
Medicare formulary, especially if cost effectiveness, as well as the
drug's effectiveness, are taken into account in setting the
standards.
For the non-Medicare portion of the health reform plan, there
is an explicit rejection of unit price controls or limits. On the
other hand, there is to be an "Advisory Council on Breakthrough
Drugs" in the Department of Health and Human Services, with the
responsibility for examining "the reasonableness of launch prices
of new drugs that represent a breakthrough or significant advance
over existing therapies."21 This council has the authority to request
data on costs, projected prescription volumes, and prices of competing drugs. With regard to prices charged to persons not covered by Medicare, the intent of promulgating a judgment that a
particular new drugs price is "unreasonable" is not specified, but
presumably, this is intended to exert public pressure on such
prices. One question, however, is whether the promise to eschew
price controls will be kept.

20
21

Health Security Act, supra note 1, at 357-58.
Id. at 290.
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IMPACT OF RATIONALIZED MANAGED COMPETITION
ON PHARMACEUTICALS

Another feature of health reform is an effort to encourage the
spread of managed care plans, either of an HMO form or of some
similar form. Even if there were no additional explicit controls on
prices or spending in the plan, this shift, if it occurs, would change
the market that drug manufacturers face even more than the market has already changed.
How does the health reform plan affect managed care firms?
The plan envisions the creation of Health Alliances through which
all firms with fewer than 5000 employees must obtain coverage.
Such Alliances would be required to offer employees a choice
among any managed care plan in the region that covers the approved list of services as long as the plan's premium is not more
than 120% of the weighted average premium of all plans the Alliance offers. The initial draft of the Clinton Plan gave the Health
Alliance the power to screen and limit the number of indemnity
plans (offering the standard benefits) that would be made available, but a recent revision eliminated this power. In addition, the
cap on the amount of tax-shielded employer payment, which the
Jackson Hole group advocated, is not to take effect until the year
2003, and at that point will apply only to employer payments for
benefits not included in the basic plan.
These features mean that the primary change in markets facing managed care plans is the requirement that managed care
plans be included in the benefit package offered to virtually all
Americans under age sixty-five. In addition, for those employment
groups choosing to have the employer pay directly only the minimum eighty percent payment, any additional premium for a more
expensive plan will have to be paid by the employee out of after-tax
dollars. Employees can tax-shield any additional premium, however, by having the employer pay that premium directly. That is,
any additional premium effectively can be tax shielded, although
the use of flexible benefit plans with flexible spending accounts as
a method of doing so will be discontinued.
Will employees then be more likely to choose managed care
plans than they do at present? For some workers who would have
preferred such plans but who did not have an option in their current benefits plan, the answer is surely affirmative. There is, however, no additional incentive or reward under the plan for
choosing a managed care or HMO arrangement-if employers
were currently offering the kind of plan almost all of their employ-
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ees would have wanted, there is nothing in the reform proposal to
suggest that the employees would not choose a similar plan from
the set of options. Perhaps lower wage employees might have preferred cheaper HMO coverage, and perhaps some employers will
reduce their contribution to the minimum required (though it is
not obvious why they need to wait for the law to do so), but in
general the plan as it emerges does not really give very strong incentive to choose the HMO over an indemnity plan. It is possible,
however, that the 120% cap will eliminate the kind of indemnity
plan many employees would prefer.
Indeed, by using regulatory power to limit provider charges to
indemnity plans, rather than by requiring such plans to bargain on
their own, the law may paradoxically increase the relative competitive advantage of such plans, compared to HMOs. Enforcement of
a premium limit may work in the same direction. For this reason,
it seems premature to conclude that there will be a massive additional shift to managed care plans. The law contains little that
would slow down the shift to managed care that is currently occurring, but it also contains little to speed it up. In what follows, however, I will assume that a larger and larger share of the population
switches into managed care from either conventional insurance or
from out-of-pocket payment for pharmaceuticals.
The essential idea behind the model of managed competition
is that buyers should choose among a variety of competing health
plans. Competition is to have two dimensions. For any given level
of benefits and quality, broadly defined, plans that offer lower premiums will attract more buyers, so there will be an incentive to
minimize costs. In addition, plans that offer more attractive benefits or quality will be able to charge more. Such plans will therefore
choose all medical inputs, including pharmaceuticals, with attention both to their costs and their benefits.
The most obvious conclusion that follows from this is that
drugs that cost more and are less effective than their competitors
will not likely be selected for further development. In principle,
health plans have both stronger incentives and better resources
than do individual physicians for discovering and using this kind of
information. Provision of such information by drug firms themselves, if the FDA does not interfere, would seem to be sensible.
Less obviously, products that increase costs but provide positive benefit may well appeal to managed care plans. At present,
many HMO managers seem to be more concerned with cost containment than with effects of drugs on outcomes or quality of life,
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but more vigorous competition among HMOs may, paradoxically,
raise consideration of relative benefits to the level of consideration
of relative costs as buyers choose among HMOs. Whether buyers
will take into account costly but beneficial drugs made available by
one plan, but not others, depends on the information buyers
possess.
The Clinton Health Reform Plan envisions, without giving
much detail, that Health Alliances will provide buyers with accurate
information about the variation in benefits or quality across health
plans. A plan that chooses the drugs with fewest side effects, and
greatest effectiveness, might then be able to justify a higher premium. A key issue is how such "report cards" will work with regard
to the pharmaceutical products different plans might or might not
choose to use. 2 2 An individual drug that raises cost but improves
outcomes could be adopted by a plan, and the plan could then
provide information to buyers about the additional benefits and of
the addition to premium caused by the use of this drug. In practice, it may prove difficult for consumers to identify specific drugs.
Indeed, too much emphasis on a given drug could cause the HMO
problems with risk selection. A more sensible strategy for a plan
may be the adoption of a portfolio or package of drugs. That is, a
plan may choose to characterize itself as slightly more expensive
than its competitors, but as one that gives better access to a set of
effective drugs with fewer side effects. Marketing to such plans will
challenge pharmaceutical firms because no single drug firm will
find it easy to offer a full, prepackaged line of products.
Another challenge that will become stronger as managed competition spreads, but that some of the features of health reform
should affect, is the marketing to managed care firms of drugs that
have a positive cost today, but that may both improve health or
reduce medical costs in the future. The problem is that there is
substantial turnover among plan members, which means that a
plan that incurs the expense of paying for such a drug may find the
benefit reaped by another plan. To be sure, informing patients
that they can expect better future health or longer survival from a
product may be sufficient to motivate patients to choose the plan
that covers the product. The only thing that turnover loses is the
present value of future insured medical cost savings.
One of the features of the rating process under health reform
is mandatory community rating.23 In order to guard against the
22
23

Id. at 863.
Mandatory community rating is the practice by which insurers must charge all

1288

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1271

possibility that some Accountable Health Plan might, by chance,
sign up risks that differ from the average, the reform bill proposes
that methods will be developed that can adjust premiums for any
differences in risks that do occur. Those plans that sign up good
risks will pay a penalty, and those that sign up bad risks will receive
transfers. This means that the plan that lowers cholesterol and
blood pressure, only to find its now-healthy population replaced by
others who are sicker, will be the recipient of transfers to be paid
by those plans to which the treated persons migrated. In this
sense, risk adjustment of premiums, if it can be implemented, will
increase the willingness of plans to adopt drugs that yield future
cost-saving benefits.
VII.

IMPACT OF GLOBAL SPENDING LIMITS ON PHARMACEUTICALS

As already noted, the current version of the Clinton Plan specifically avoids drug price or spending controls for the population
aged under sixty-five. The plan does envision, however, some quite
dramatic limits on the rate of growth in premiums and total health
care spending. From its current level of approximately 4.5% per
year, real growth in health care spending is to be lowered nearly to
zero by the year 2000, recovering only to the rate of growth of real
GDP thereafter. Because a limit on premiums must eventually constrain the rate of growth in costs, one might reasonably expect
these limits to affect all components of total spending, including
pharmaceuticals.
The most obvious consequence of such limits will be to provide an advantage to those drugs that are low cost and those drugs
that can lower total spending. Conversely, products producing improved outcomes, but at high cost, will be at a disadvantage. Technically, the limit on spending growth need only affect the number
and type of new products introduced. A limit on spending will
probably also increase the scrutiny applied to existing products,
however, in order to see if existing products should be deleted to
make way for new products. Ultimately the equilibrium will be one
in which outcome per dollar of cost is equalized across products,
but with the level of this cutoff depending on the target growth
rate in spending.
The spending limits should also accentuate the health plans'
need to obtain products at the lowest possible cost. Therefore, one
can expect more resistance to price increases, and more aggressive
individuals in the community or areas the same charge or premium, irrespective of
their risk or potential demand for health care services.
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bargaining for discounts. This added incentive to lower cost might
also create opportunities for drugs that are low cost but slightly less
effective or with more side effects than their competitors. Plans
will be forced to give up some aspects of quality, and move to products with better effectiveness-to-cost ratios even if the products'
overall effectiveness is less than their competitors'.
The other challenge to managed care plans will be that of rationing the quantity of drugs and other goods and services that
their members use. Products with features that make rationing easier, such as few alternative indications or time-limited actions,
might be especially advantageous. Drug utilization review programs, and more aggressive formularies, can also be expected to
spread, especially when the stronger limits on premium growth become effective after 1996.
There is, however, a question of whether these limits (or the
analogous, but more specific tie of drug price increases to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Medicare coverage) will really be
binding. As of this writing, it appears that the rate of increase in
drug prices and spending has declined substantially from its high
in the late 1980s, and it is possible that the growth may fall below
that of the CPI. Paradoxically, the limit on total premium growth
may indirectly constrain drug prices and drug use more than the
specific Medicare limit on drug prices. This is because the overall
limit provides incentives for managed care plans to restrict all categories of spending, not just those increasing most rapidly.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The final set of insurance coverages and spending limits that
will be embodied in health reform must still be determined, but
there is little doubt that there will be stronger market incentives to
control spending, and probably stronger regulatory rules as well.
The reasons for the sudden increase in drug prices in the late
1980s (at least as measured by the CPI) and drug spending are not
well known, and it is possible that such growth was a response to
one-time stimuli, rather than to fundamental influences. If this is
true, health reform will affect the pharmaceutical industry less
than other parts of the health industry, where growing levels of
spending have also occurred. If it is not true, then price and regulatory limits will be restrictive. Whether it is true or not, health
reform proposals will set in place a regulatory structure of unknown form and effectiveness, a structure that will need to be
monitored carefully.

